

THANK YOU, PRESIDENT RICHARDS. DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, MEMBERS OF THE PHILADELPHIA COUNCIL OF THE NAVY LEAGUE, THE SECOND LARGEST IN THE UNITED STATES:

I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW PLEASED I AM TO BE WITH YOU TODAY. IT CERTAINLY IS AN HONOR TO JOIN YOU IN HELPING TO CELEBRATE THE 197TH BIRTHDAY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. I FEEL PRIVILEGED TO BE WITH ONE OF OUR COUNTRY'S PREMIER NAVY LEAGUE COUNCILS AND RECOGNIZE OUR NAVY'S BIRTHDAY IN ITS BIRTHPLACE.

I TAKE HUMBLE PRIDE IN STANDING HERE IN THE VIRTUAL SHADOW OF COMMODORE JOHN BARRY'S STATUE -- THE FATHER OF THE AMERICAN NAVY. I UNDERSTAND YOU LAID A WREATH AT THE COMMODORE BARRY STATUE BACK ON OCTOBER 13TH, THE ACTUAL BIRTHDAY OF THE NAVY -- AND THAT TODAY IS THE OFFICIAL RECOGNITION. I'M SURE ADMIRAL VETH JOINS ME IN SAYING "THANK YOU" FOR MAKING THIS A TRULY MEMORABLE BIRTHDAY.

IT IS ALWAYS EXCITING FOR A NAVY MAN TO COME BACK TO PHILADELPHIA. MY FIRST VISIT WAS IN 1945 WHEN I PLAYED IN THE ARMY-NAVY GAME WHEN I FIRST CAME BACK TO PHILADELPHIA AFTER THE WAR. THE SCORE THAT DAY WASN'T TOO GOOD, BUT THE PHILADELPHIAN HOSPITALITY WAS AND HAS BEEN EVER SINCE. I AM SURE YOU WILL BE WELCOMING THE NAVY TEAM HERE ON DECEMBER 2ND AND ALSO A WEEK FROM SATURDAY WHEN THEY BEAT ND.

Navy Declassification/Release Instructions on File

BEFORE GETTING INTO MY MAIN SPEECH I WANT TO TAKE JUST ANOTHER MOMENT TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE SPLENDID JOB YOU HAVE DONE IN DEVELOPING THE NAVAL SEA CADET PROGRAM IN THIS AREA. I'M EXTREMELY PLEASED TO SEE THE SEA CADET COLOR GUARD HERE TODAY. THEY'RE AN OUTSTANDING GROUP OF YOUNG MEN AND I SALUTE THEM. I URGE YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO GET ANOTHER UNIT GOING OUT IN DELAWARE COUNTY -- AS YOU KNOW THE SEA CADET PROGRAM IS AN EXCELLENT TRAINING PROGRAM FOR INTERESTED AND QUALIFIED YOUNG MEN AND IT GETS THEM THINKING ABOUT A NAVY CAREER -- WITH THE ALL VOLUNTEER NAVY JUST AROUND THE CORNER WE MUST CONTINUE TO EXPAND THOSE PROGRAM WHICH CAN ACQUAINT OUR TOP YOUNG PEOPLE WITH THE MANY EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES OF THE NAVY.

TODAY I FEEL MUCH LIKE A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF A COMPANY MAKING ITS ANNUAL REPORT TO ITS STOCKHOLDERS -- YOU AS CITIZENS ARE THE STOCKHOLDERS OF THE NAVY. BECAUSE YOU PHILADELPHIANS ARE SPECIAL NAVY STOCKHOLDERS, I AM GOING TO TALK IN SPECIFICS AND DETAILS THAT MIGHT GO OVER THE HEAD OF AN AVERAGE AUDIENCE WHAT I WANT TO DO IS TO GIVE YOU A FEEL FOR SOME OF THE TRENDS OR CHANGES THAT ARE TAKING PLACE TODAY AND WHICH WILL SHAPE YOUR NAVY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

WHAT IS YOUR NAVY LIKE TODAY?

1. VERY BUSY - SURGED CVA's - 4 TO 9
SETTLED BACK TO 6 PLUS 2 IN MED
FOR INDIVIDUAL SAILOR MEANS 7.5 MONTHS AWAY FROM HOME
WE ARE STRETCHED THIN
2. FACING TOUGHEST COMPETITION SINCE 1942
SOVIET NAVY MODERN, CAPABLE, GROWING
WE STILL HAVE EDGE DUE EXPERIENCE AND EXCLUSIVE
CARRIER CAPABILITY
DANGER BECOMING THE AVIS
3. MAKING CHANGES TO ADAPT TO TIMES UNDER DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP Z
BEARDS, BEER, CIVILIAN CLOTHES
DEEPER - LISTENING MORE, LOOKING AFTER PEOPLE MORE
ATTEMPTING CAST OFF SHACKLES OF TRADITION WHERE NOT
ESSENTIAL TO DISCIPLINE OR EFFECTIVENESS
IMPORTANT - YOUTH - SOCIAL/INTELLECTUAL TRENDS
4. MORE SUBTLE - LESS PERCEIVED CHANGE IN WAY GOING ABOUT OUR JOB
CHARACTERIZE - INTELLECTUAL APPROACH -
LORD NELSON
"NO CAPTAIN CAN GO VERY FAR WRONG IF HE LAYS HIS
SHIP ALONGSIDE THAT OF THE ENEMY"
A SIMPLE STRAIGHT FORWARD AXIOM

IN PAST AXIOMS LIKE THIS, INTUITION ADEQUATE GUIDELINES
PEACE TIME TRAINING EXERCISES

I WOULD LIKE SUGGEST TONIGHT AXIOMS AND
EXERCISES FAR LESS USEFUL TO US TODAY,
INSTEAD THE TIME FOR MEN WHO ARE THINKERS
AS WELL AS DOERS HAS COME.

LET ILLUSTRATE - DISCUSS EACH THREE ROLES NAVY PLAYS FOR YOU
STRATEGIC - WHY MORE INTELLECTUAL APPROACH

NO ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE - EXERCISES

MUST THINK OUT IN ADVANCE - TECHNOLOGY CHANGING

PRIME CONSIDERATION NEVER LET ENEMY GAIN POSITION FOR
SUCCESSFUL 1ST STRIKE

NOT SIMPLE QUESTION HOW MANY MISSILES EACH HAVE
WHAT AMOUNT POTENTIAL DAMAGE ENEMY WILL
VIEW AS UNACCEPTABLE

PHYSICIST, MATH - PSYCHOLOGIST, SOCIOLOGIST
PROBABILITY KNOCK OUT MISSILE SILOS

IF COULD BOMBERS AND SUBS ADEQUATE?

PROBABILITY KNOCK OUT MISSILES AND BOMBERS
SUB ENOUGH?

ABM?

NOT INTEND GO INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION NUCLEAR STRATEGY
EQUATION. WANT MAKE POINT COMPLEX INTERACTIONS - DEMAND
OFFICERS WITH INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY TO HANDLE MANY VARIABLES AT ONCE

AND IN HIGHLY TECHNICAL ARENA - TERMS LIKE TIME OF FLIGHT,
COORDINATED ACTION, ESOTERIC CONCEPTS LIKE PINNING DOWN
MISSILES TEMPORARILY WITH NUCLEAR RADIATION,
NOT ONLY COMPLEX AND TECHNICAL - DEMANDS PEOPLE WHO CAN THINK
FAST

IF DECISION EVER HAD TO BE MADE - MINUTES

NOT PLANNING TO HAVE TO MAKE THEM - BUT IF IT WERE CLEAR
WE COULD NOT - DETERRENT MIGHT BE IMPAIRED

SECOND ROLE - ENGAGE IN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IF CALLED UPON
LOOK AT DEFENSE OF SHIPS AGAINST MISSILES

ONE REASON OFFENSIVE MISSILES OMINOUS SOLUTION NOT
STRAIGHT FORWARD

NOT CASE OF MY DEFENSIVE WEAPON AGAINST YOUR MISSILE
TO ILLUSTRATE THIS MUST LOOK AT WHAT IT TAKES FOR AN ENEMY
PUT A MISSILE ONTO ONE OF OUR SHIPS

1. BROUGHT TO LAUNCH RANGE
2. FIND TARGET
3. NOT BE SHOT DOWN EN ROUTE

START BY ATTACKING PLATFORM PRIOR TO LAUNCH

MATTER OF PROBABILITIES - 600 MILES vs 60

MISSILE MUST FIND TARGET - MISSILE DUMB

ATTEMPT CONFUSE MISSILE OR ITS HUMAN ADVISORS -

ELECTRONIC DECOYS - JAM
LOT OF SHIPS -
FORMATION - CONDENSE - DISPERSE
ELECTRONIC SILENCE - HIDE

MISSILE MUST FLY THROUGH DEFENSES

1. MIXING DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IS NOT A SIMPLE TASK
ELECTRONIC SILENCE AND USE OF MISSILES INCOMPATIBLE
ELECTRONIC DECEPTION ONLY GOOD AGAINST CERTAIN MISSILES
AT CERTAIN TIMES

2. INTERACTION ALL THESE SYSTEMS THAT AUGURS FOR
SUCCESS - NO ONE SOLE ANSWER

INDIVIDUAL MUST UNDERSTAND SEQUENCE OF
ACTIONS AND COUNTER-ACTIONS AND THE TECHNICAL
LIMITS AND CAPABILITIES EACH COMPONENT. NOT
ADEQUATE HAVE A MAN WHO IS LIMITED TO HIS OWN
EXPERIENCE IN WAR OR EXERCISES

NOTE - IT ALL HAPPENS SO FAST

FINALLY - DETERRENCE THROUGH PEACETIME PRESENCE

STOCK IN TRADE SINCE WW II

USED TO BE ANY OLD GUN BOAT WOULD DO
VITAL TAILOR CAPABILITY PERCEIVED AS A CREDIBLE
THREAT FOR PARTICULAR SITUATION.
TODAY'S NAVAL COMMANDER SAME MAN OF ACTION -
INSPIRING LEADER
ALSO BETTER BE A SOPHISTICATED THINKER -
USE COMPUTERS TO SPEED RESPONSE
CONTROL THEM -
NOT SIMPLY HIS FINGER ON BUTTON -
UNDERSTANDS WHAT THAT DUMB COMPUTER IS TELLING HIM

SECOND, HE MUST ALSO UNDERSTAND SOMETHING OF PROBABILITIES -
HOW DOES HE CALCULATE THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS OF
EACH COMPONENT HE HAS AT HIS DISPOSAL?
HE MUST THINK IN TERMS OF ANALYSIS, OF OPTIONS,
PROBABILITIES AND OF ENSURING THAT HE HAS LOOKED AT
ALL ASPECTS OF HIS PROBLEM -

THE PROSPECT OF HAVING TO DEVELOP LEADERS LIKE THIS
MEANS SEVERAL THINGS TO YOUR NAVY TODAY

1. MUST PRODUCE MEN TECHNICALLY COMPETENT
2. MUST ACCENT THE THINKING, REASONING AND ANALYTIC
PROCESS IN OUR OFFICER EDUCATION

AT NWC, NEW CURRICULUM - READING - WRITING - BAR
SECOND AND LONGER TERM IMPLICATION OF THIS TREND
RECRUITING

MUST GET REASONABLE SHARE BRIGHTER YOUNG PEOPLE
VOLUNTEER FORCE

NEED YOUR HELP - BY ENSURING YOUTH GROW UP UNDER-
STANDING PROFESSION HONORABLE
BUT NATURE OF BEAST IS AN HELP IN ITSELF
TODAY THE ADDITION OF A GREATER INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE TO
TRADITIONAL APPEALS OF A CAREER MAKE THAT CAREER MORE
EXCITING THAN EVER
GOING TO BE MUCH LESS MARCHING IN STEP TO A PRE-
PLANNED BATTLE DOCTRINE - MUCH GREATER SCOPE FOR
INDIVIDUAL THINKING AND INITIATIVE
FINALLY YOUNG MEN WILL SEE THAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY WILL DEPEND MORE
EVER ON THE INTELLECTUAL FIBER OF YOUR MILITARY LEADERS. NOT JUST SO
IF GET INTO ANOTHER WAR EVEN THOUGH ALL HOPEFUL BE ABLE AVOID ACTUAL
MILITARY CONFLICTS, ABILITY DO SO WILL DEPEND WHETHER SMART ENOUGH
TO STAY ABREAST OF ENEMY TECHNOLOGY AND TACTICS. IF NOT WILL NOT
DETER BECAUSE THE ENEMY WILL RECOGNIZE US AS A PAPER TIGER
THEREFORE WHETHER WE WILL BE FORCED INTO EMPLOYING MILITARY FORCE
OR NOT IS LIKELY TO BE IN PART OF A PRODUCT OF THE INTELLECTUAL
CAPABILITY THAT YOUR ARMED FORCES POSSESS.
I AM EXCITED AT BEING IN TODAY'S NAVY -- IT IS STIMULATING AND
CHALLENGING -- I SEE TOMORROW'S NAVY AS EVEN MORE SO. WITH
SUPPORT OF CITIZENS LIKE YOU I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL FIND WITHIN
TODAY'S YOUTH THE INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP THAT WILL KEEP OUR NAVY
AND OUR NATION STRONG AND SAFE

FYI ~~ROUGH~~ OF ~~PHILLY~~ SPEECH

though
Being with you today in this Navy town makes me feel like the Member of the Board of Directors of a Corporation that's reporting to his Stockholders. Only you are of course, the citizens, the Navy's stockholders, but you Philadelphians are our particular stockholders. In my talk today I would like to talk in a little more detail and a little more specifics, than I would normally, that might go over the heads of the average audience.

I'd like to try to talk to you about some of the trends and changes that are taking place in the Navy today, which will affect its shape in the years to come.

The first one that strikes my mind is the Navy is today stretched very thin. When the President called for an increased amount of activity from Thailand and from the ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, last May in order to support the National Policy, the Navy increased its Carrier Force deployed in the Far Far Eastern waters from four Attack Carriers to nine, and all the supporting ships that go with them. In addition, as you know, we maintain two Carriers deployed all the time in the Mediterranean. We've backed down from nine to six in the Far East at the present time, but with six out there and two in the Mediterranean, today, this afternoon, we have eight out of fifteen Attack Carriers deployed overseas.

If you're a sailor on one of those, you have a mathematical chance of being away from home seven and a half months out of

every year, if we tried to maintain that rate of deployment. That, of course, is unacceptable to our men, because even the other four and a half months when they're "home," they must exercise, go out to sea, and train ~~totdototherhthings~~. We are stretched thin right now.

The second characteristic of your Navy today worth knowing is that we are facing the greatest challenge at sea that we have known since 1942, in my opinion. The Soviet Navy is capable, it's strong, and it's growing! I still believe, in my opinion, that we have the edge--first, because of our greater experience, second because of our monopoly in Aircraft Carriers. I would not be quite right with you if I didn't say that unless we watch our P's and Q's, we stand a risk that your Navy will become the Avis of the navies of the world.

Thirdly, we are in a period in the United States Navy that started two years ago, of making dramatic and dynamic changes to keep up with the times, under the leadership of our fine Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt. Everyone has read about the beer in the barracks and the beards on the sailors and civilian clothes on the ships for liberty in foreign ports. And while these things get publicity, what we are trying to do in keeping up with the times, goes much deeper. It goes into listening more to our people, paying more attention to them, trying to be more responsive and understanding. And we're doing this by means of casting off the shackles of tradition, where tradition is not essential to discipline or effectiveness.

And we must do this, because the lifeblood, the heart of the Navy, are the young men who man our ships and aircraft. And unless we understand the changes in the intellectual and social climate in this country, and move to adapt to them where we can, we are not going to attract into, or retain, or motivate, those young men who are so essential to maintaining an efficient, strong Navy.

Fourth, I would like to talk at a little more length, of the more subtle and less-perceived change that is coming over the way we go about doing our job in the Navy. And I would characterize this as a more intellectual approach to life.

About two hundred years ago, Lord Nelson made the following statement: "No Captain can go very far wrong if he lays his ship alongside that of the enemy." That was a simple, straightforward axiom for action, and it was applicable to the Captains of his day. And in the past, axioms, intuition, courage, ingenuity, were very fine and almost adequate guides for a Naval Commander in combat. And besides that he had a heritage of training exercises that he'd done in peacetime, to fall back on. And you know the old adage that if you go out to sea, and on your right flank you have your friend, Joe; on your left flank, Bill, and you've got a common educational heritage, and you've gone through the same kind of training exercises together, you can pretty well count on what everyone is going to do and work together. I would suggest today that axioms, and exercises, while still important, are not as important as they were some years ago.

Instead, the time has come for men who are thinkers as well as doers. To illustrate this more specifically, I would like to give an example of why I believe this is so, from each of the three missionaries, or roles that the Navy plays for you, the citizens of the country.

Our first and most important role, of course, is Strategic Nuclear Deterrence. POLARIS/POSEIDON Submarines are maintained on patrol and discourage anyone from attacking us with nuclear weapons.

Our second mission, of course, is to engage, when called upon, in conventional warfare, maintaining sea lines that are vital to this country, projecting air power overseas from our Carriers, or projecting ground power overseas from our marine Amphibious Forces.

And the third mission, of course, is to maintain a peacetime presence overseas in order to deter the outbreak of conventional war.

Now let's start with this Strategic picture. And why do we need a more intellectual and more thinking approach to this form of potential warfare. Well, first, of course, nobody has any accumulated experience in nuclear warfare, thank Goodness, and we can't hardly have training exercises in it, either. So we have to have people who are able to intellectually think out this process in advance and in the face of very rapid-changing technology. The prime consideration in Strategic Deterrence is not to let an enemy get into a position of a First Strike

capability. Now by First Strike we mean that he would feel that he could attack us with nuclear weapons and not receive unacceptable damage in return. Now this is not a simple question of how many missiles we have, and how many missiles he has. It is a question of what retaliatory capability is sufficient to make him feel that it is unwise and unsafe to take advantage of us.

Now, to measure that is a combination of the arts of the nuclear physicist, the mathematician, the psychologist, the sociologist, and many others. We have to wrap all this together and ask ourselves questions such as "What if he could knock out all of our siloes with missiles in them in this country? Would the remaining bombers and nuclear-powered submarines be an adequate deterrent?" Or, "What if he could knock out both the missile siloes and the submarines? [I mean the bombers.] Would the submarines be an adequate deterrent left?" Or, What about his anti-ballistic missile defense? Since he can't hit the submarines, could he take out the missiles as they come in?"

Now I don't want to get further into a detailed discussion of a nuclear equation, but I want to make the point that there are very complex interactions here, and it demands officers with an intellectual capacity to handle many variables at one time in one problem. And they have to be able to deal with highly technical issues--terms like time of flight, coordinated action, nuclear pindown, throwaway, the things like this that are constantly changing as technology moves ahead. And they have to be able to think rapidly. If the time ever came to make a

decision in this field, it would be done in matters of minutes, not hours or days or weeks. I don't mean to say that we think anyone's ever going to have to make this decision to use nuclear weapons. But I'm saying if the enemy ever felt that we did not have the capability to react that quickly, to think that quickly, and to understand the problem that quickly, we simply would not have a deterrent.

On the second role of the Navy, conventional warfare, let me illustrate the need for a greater thinking approach to this by taking one small, but I think, representative example. The case of the threat to our surface ship today, of missiles. You've heard and read about this, and it's indeed a serious problem for the Navy. It appears ^{that} at this particular time in military history, the Offense is on the ascendancy. But one reason the offensive missiles seem so ominous, is that the defense against them is not a straightforward matter. It's a very complex interaction. To understand that, let's consider what an enemy must do in order to get a missile on our ships.

First, he must bring the missile within launching range. Second, he must set the missile off in such a way that it will in fact, find the right target. Third, he must fly the missile through whatever defenses we have, so that it arrives intact.

Well, that means that in our defense against it, we start by trying to attack--or we can start, by trying to attack the Platform, the Launching Platform before he launches his missiles. For instance, the platform that comes in could be a bomber,

it could be a submarine, it could be a surface ship. Let's assume it's a bomber, and let's assume it could launch its missiles at eighty or a hundred miles from us. We could send out Fighter-Interceptors to shoot it down, deny it that opportunity. But at a hundred miles we would have a six-hundred mile perimeter to concern ourselves with unless we knew the fairly precise direction from which the bombers were likely to come.

Now we have an alternative here. We can hold our Fighter/Interceptors back and try to shoot down the missiles, perhaps say, ten miles from our Carrier, or our surface ship? Well then we have only a sixty-mile perimeter. Now I'm sure you'll appreciate that it's easier with a Fighter to shoot down a Bomber than it is a missile. So we have a trade-off to analyze and see where we think we'd get the most return in the employment of this Fighter/Interceptor weapon.

Let's move on and look at the second step. The fact that this dumb missile has got to find, to be smart enough to locate the target that they want it to hit. And we can do a number of things here. We can use electronic decoys and jam him. We can go into electronic silence to hide. We can disperse our formation so there are very few targets when the missile shows up. We can compact our formation so there's lots of defensive power when the missile shows up. And we can try combinations of these.

Now, lastly, we have to look at the process of the missile trying to fly from where it was launched into where we are. And here we have our Fighter/Interceptors that I've mentioned,

that can attack it en route. We have our antimissile missiles. We have long-range guns. We have short-range guns

Now, again I'm not trying to get into the detailed equation here. I'm trying to stress the point that this is a complicated mix, and it's not a simple task to decide between these things that are available to us.

For instance, if we use the electronic silence, as a way of hiding our ships, we cannot use our antimissile missiles, because they depend on a radar to guide them. Now the interaction of these systems, the cumulative effect of all of them, is what's going to turn the tide in our favor. There's no single, simple answer of one system against another. So we must have individuals capable of understanding this sequence of action and counteraction, of understanding the limitations and capabilities of each of these weapons systems. We must have men who are able to transcend their own experience in wartime or in exercises, and understand fully all of these systems. If the man is an Aviator who is in charge of this, he must not rely only on Fighter/Interceptors, he has to be equally conversant with all of the other electronic gun and missile systems that are involved if he is going to bring off the maximum defensive capability. And here again, he must be able to react in literally, split-second timing. From the moment that your radar on the surface ship detects an incoming missile, you may have only thirty seconds until your last opportunity to shoot a gun or a missile back.

Finally, let me talk about the intellectual content of even the Peacetime President's role. Peacetime Presidents, of course, have been the Navy's stock-in-trade ever since World War II. We've been in places like the Tachinan Islands in 1958. We've been the primary factor behind the success in the Cuban Missile Crisis in '62. In 1970 we were in the Jordanian crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, and just eleven months ago, in the Bangladesh/India/Pakistan situation.

Now it used to be that any old gunboat would do in this kind of a situation. You simply brought up the nearest thing, let the Sheikh or Potentate know that you were really interested, and he'd better take into account the United States position. It isn't quite that simple today. We need to look and see whether the particular force we can bring to bear is indeed a perceivable and a credible threat against that particular situation. I happen to have been a Carrier Task Group Commander during the Jordanian crisis two years ago. One of the tasks we were given was to help insure the safety of American citizens in Amman, Jordan. Well, the problem wasn't the Jordanian Government. It wasn't even the Syrian Government that was attacking Jordan. It was the Palestinian Rebels who were inside Amman and were doing considerable damage to property and people. Now we had Aircraft Carriers out there and they were an awesome threat, but not really very awesome to the guerrillas, who had no Government, who had no geographical entity. They were just a rebel group. So what we did--we brought up a

Helicopter Carrier with Marines embarked, and were able to stand by , and if called upon, be able to go right into the scene, secure the lives of the Americans, and bring them out.

So what I'm saying here is that we have to look at the specific purpose much more than I think we did in the past. So today's Naval Commander must be the same man of action, must have the same leadership capabilities as the days of old, but he must also have the ability to, for instance, use computers but think faster. Using a computer isn't a simple thing. You've got to be smarter than that dumb machine. And by being smarter I don't mean that you put your finger on the button instead of the computer's. Unless you understand what that computer's telling you, unless you understand how much information you need, and how much will swamp you, you may find that you have no alternative when the computer says, "Push," or "Don't push." You've got to be smart.

And our Naval Leader today must understand something of probabilities and calculations of how much he should use at one Force or another. He must look at the probability of success based on all of these factors that are available to him. We call this "conditional probabilities." It was a conditional probability that you would shoot down the bomber; a conditional probability that you would decoy with electronics; a conditional probability that you would shoot down the missile with a gun or a missile; a conditional probability that the enemy missile would in fact, have a failure and dump itself into the ocean.

Tomorrow's Commander must be sure that he understands what all those probabilities are so that he takes advantage of each one and maximizes his opportunity.

This change in the way we do business has several impacts on the way the Navy is going to shape itself in the years to come. First, we must continue to produce men who are highly capable in technical fields. Beyond that, we must accent the thinking, reasoning, and analytic process in our officer education. And this is why at the Naval War College this year we have instituted an entirely new curriculum; because the officers we are training there are moving well into the top of their career, and out of this group are going to come some of the real leaders of our Navy of the next decade. And we're trying to make them think more, reason more, and instead of being spoonfed with lecturers and classroom activities, they're doing things like--right now they're reading a thousand pages of Military History a week. They're writing an essay, and they're going to Seminar discussions where they hammer out all sides of an issue. And they're working harder than ever before because they must achieve these qualities I have described. I'm a poor one to judge whether we are, in fact, succeeding, but I have one measure that I think is encouraging. The Manager of the Officers' Club at Newport tells me the profits of his bar are down by two-thirds this year.

A last impact on the Navy of this kind of change of doing business is in our recruiting. We simply must get our share of the brighter young people of this country. We're going to

an all-volunteer force. That creates new challenges for us. We need your help. And I know that we can count on it from you, the citizen arm of the Navy. And I think the area where you can help most is in things like your Sea Cadet program. But in doing things like that, and insuring that the youth of this country are raised with an understanding that the military profession is an honorable profession, a patriotic profession, and a necessary one--necessary if we are going to deter conflict and preserve peace. And I am encouraged because I think the very nature of the beast I am describing will help us in our recruiting efforts. In short, today, with this greater intellectual challenge in the Navy added to the traditional appeals of a Navy career, I think it is more enticing than before. There's going to be less marching in step to pre-planned doctrine, more room for initiative and imagination. And I sincerely believe that the young men of our country will perceive that our national security in the years ahead will depend more than ever before on the intellectual fiber of their military leaders. This is not only if we are forced into actual combat, because we all hope that we will be able to avoid that. But if we are not smart enough to stay ahead of the enemy in technology, in tactics, we will not deter him, and we will be forced into situations that are against our national interests.

And therefore, whether we are forced into employing military force again or not, we very likely could be in large part a product of the intellectual capabilities that your Armed Forces possess.

I'm excited about today's Navy. I find it stimulating, challenging, and I see tomorrow's Navy as even more so. With the support of citizens like you I am very confident that we can find within today's youth, the intellectual leadership that will keep your Navy strong and your nation safe.

Thank you so much for letting me be with you today! #

End of Lecture. (by VADM Stansfield Turner, USN)

Turner

06:

~~FYI~~ ~~ROUGH OF DAILY SPEECH~~
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Speech File

though
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The first one that strikes my mind is the Navy is today stretched very thin. When the President called for an increased amount of activity from Thailand and from the ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, last May in order to support the National Policy, the Navy increased its Carrier Force deployed in the Far Far Eastern waters from four Attack Carriers to nine, and all the supporting ships that go with them. In addition, as you know, we maintain two Carriers deployed all the time in the Mediterranean. We've backed down from nine to six in the Far East at the present time, but with six out there and two in the Mediterranean, today, this afternoon, we have eight out of fifteen Attack Carriers deployed overseas.

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And we must do this, because the lifeblood, the heart of the Navy, are the young men who man our ships and aircraft. And unless we understand the changes in the intellectual and social climate in this country, and move to adapt to them where we can, we are not going to attract into, or retain, or motivate, those young men who are so essential to maintaining an efficient, strong Navy.

Fourth, I would like to talk at a little more length, of the more subtle and less-perceived change that is coming over the way we go about doing our job in the Navy. And I would characterize this as a more intellectual approach to life.

About two hundred years ago, Lord Nelson made the following statement: "No Captain can go very far wrong if he lays his ship alongside that of the enemy." That was a simple, straightforward axiom for action, and it was applicable to the Captains of his day. And in the past, axioms, intuition, courage, ingenuity, were very fine and almost adequate guides for a Naval Commander in combat. And besides that he had a heritage of training exercises that he'd done in peacetime, to fall back on. And you know the old adage that if you go out to sea, and on your right flank you have your friend, Joe; on your left flank, Bill, and you've got a common educational heritage, and you've gone through the same kind of training exercises together, you can pretty well count on what everyone is going to do and work together. I would suggest today that axioms, and exercises, while still important, are not as important as they were some years ago.

Instead, the time has come for men who are thinkers as well as doers. To illustrate this more specifically, I would like to give an example of why I believe this is so, from each of the three missionaries, or roles that the Navy plays for you, the citizens of the country.

Our first and most important role, of course, is Strategic Nuclear Deterrence. POLARIS/POSEIDON Submarines are maintained on patrol and discourage anyone from attacking us with nuclear weapons.

Our second mission, of course, is to engage, when called upon, in conventional warfare, maintaining sea lines that are vital to this country, projecting air power overseas from our Carriers, or projecting ground power overseas from our marine Amphibious Forces.

And the third mission, of course, is to maintain a peacetime presence overseas in order to deter the outbreak of conventional war.

Now let's start with this Strategic picture. And why do we need a more intellectual and more thinking approach to this form of potential warfare. Well, first, of course, nobody has any accumulated experience in nuclear warfare, thank Goodness, and we can't hardly have training exercises in it, either. So we have to have people who are able to intellectually think out this process in advance and in the face of very rapid-changing technology. The prime consideration in Strategic Deterrence is not to let an enemy get into a position of a First Strike

capability. Now by First Strike we mean that he would feel that he could attack us with nuclear weapons and not receive unacceptable damage in return. Now this is not a simple question of how many missiles we have, and how many missiles he has. It is a question of what retaliatory capability is sufficient to make him feel that it is unwise and unsafe to take advantage of us.

Now, to measure that is a combination of the arts of the nuclear physicist, the mathematician, the psychologist, the sociologist, and many others. We have to wrap all this together and ask ourselves questions such as "What if he could knock out all of our siloes with missiles in them in this country? Would the remaining bombers and nuclear-powered submarines be an adequate deterrent?" Or, "What if he could knock out both the missile siloes and the submarines? [I mean the bombers.] Would the submarines be an adequate deterrent left?" Or, What about his anti-ballistic missile defense? Since he can't hit the submarines, could he take out the missiles as they come in?"

Now I don't want to get further into a detailed discussion of a nuclear equation, but I want to make the point that there are very complex interactions here, and it demands officers with an intellectual capacity to handle many variables at one time in one problem. And they have to be able to deal with highly technical issues--terms like time of flight, coordinated action, nuclear pindown, throwaway, the things like this that are constantly changing as technology moves ahead. And they have to be able to think rapidly. If the time ever came to make a

decision in this field, it would be done in matters of minutes, not hours or days or weeks. I don't mean to say that we think anyone's ever going to have to make this decision to use nuclear weapons. But I'm saying if the enemy ever felt that we did not have the capability to react that quickly, to think that quickly, and to understand the problem that quickly, we simply would not have a deterrent.

On the second role of the Navy, conventional warfare, let me illustrate the need for a greater thinking approach to this by taking one small, but I think, representative example. The case of the threat to our surface ship today, of missiles. You've heard and read about this, and it's indeed a serious problem for the Navy. It appears ^{that} at this particular time in military history, the Offense is on the ascendancy. But one reason the offensive missiles seem so ominous, is that the defense against them is not a straightforward matter. It's a very complex interaction. To understand that, let's consider what an enemy must do in order to get a missile on our ships.

First, he must bring the missile within launching range. Second, he must set the missile off in such a way that it will in fact, find the right target. Third, he must fly the missile through whatever defenses we have, so that it arrives intact.

Well, that means that in our defense against it, we start by trying to attack--or we can start, by trying to attack the Platform, the Launching Platform before he launches his missiles. For instance, the platform that comes in could be a bomber,

it could be a submarine, it could be a surface ship. Let's assume it's a bomber, and let's assume it could launch its missiles at eighty or a hundred miles from us. We could send out Fighter-Interceptors to shoot it down, deny it that opportunity. But at a hundred miles we would have a six-hundred mile perimeter to concern ourselves with unless we knew the fairly precise direction from which the bombers were likely to come.

Now we have an alternative here. We can hold our Fighter/Interceptors back and try to shoot down the missiles, perhaps say, ten miles from our Carrier, or our surface ship? Well then we have only a sixty-mile perimeter. Now I'm sure you'll appreciate that it's easier with a Fighter to shoot down a Bomber than it is a missile. So we have a trade-off to analyze and see where we think we'd get the most return in the employment of this Fighter/Interceptor weapon.

Let's move on and look at the second step. The fact that this dumb missile has got to find, to be smart enough to locate the target that they want it to hit. And we can do a number of things here. We can use electronic decoys and jam him. We can go into electronic silence to hide. We can disperse our formation so there are very few targets when the missile shows up. We can compact our formation so there's lots of defensive power when the missile shows up. And we can try combinations of these.

Now, lastly, we have to look at the process of the missile trying to fly from where it was launched into where we are. And here we have our Fighter/Interceptors that I've mentioned,

that can attack it en route. We have our antimissile missiles. We have long-range guns. We have short-range guns

Now, again I'm not trying to get into the detailed equation here. I'm trying to stress the point that this is a complicated mix, and it's not a simple task to decide between these things that are available to us.

For instance, if we use the electronic silence, as a way of hiding our ships, we cannot use our antimissile missiles, because they depend on a radar to guide them. Now the interaction of these systems, the cumulative effect of all of them, is what's going to turn the tide in our favor. There's no single, simple answer of one system against another. So we must have individuals capable of understanding this sequence of action and counteraction, of understanding the limitations and capabilities of each of these weapons systems. We must have men who are able to transcend their own experience in wartime or in exercises, and understand fully all of these systems. If the man is an Aviator who is in charge of this, he must not rely only on Fighter/Interceptors, he has to be equally conversant with all of the other electronic gun and missile systems that are involved if he is going to bring off the maximum defensive capability. And here again, he must be able to react in literally, split-second timing. From the moment that your radar on the surface ship detects an incoming missile, you may have only thirty seconds until your last opportunity to shoot a gun or a missile back.

Finally, let me talk about the intellectual content of even the Peacetime President's role. Peacetime Presidents, of course, have been the Navy's stock-in-trade ever since World War II. We've been in places like the Tachinan Islands in 1958. We've been the primary factor behind the success in the Cuban Missile Crisis in '62. In 1970 we were in the Jordanian crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, and just eleven months ago, in the Bangladesh/India/Pakistan situation.

Now it used to be that any old gunboat would do in this kind of a situation. You simply brought up the nearest thing, let the Sheikh or Potentate know that you were really interested, and he'd better take into account the United States position. It isn't quite that simple today. We need to look and see whether the particular force we can bring to bear is indeed a perceivable and a credible threat against that particular situation. I happen to have been a Carrier Task Group Commander during the Jordanian crisis two years ago. One of the tasks we were given was to help insure the safety of American citizens in Amman, Jordan. Well, the problem wasn't the Jordanian Government. It wasn't even the Syrian Government that was attacking Jordan. It was the Palestinian Rebels who were inside Amman and were doing considerable damage to property and people. Now we had Aircraft Carriers out there and they were an awesome threat, but not really very awesome to the guerrillas, who had no Government, who had no geographical entity. They were just a rebel group. So what we did--we brought up a

Helicopter Carrier with Marines embarked, and were able to stand by , and if called upon, be able to go right into the scene, secure the lives of the Americans, and bring them out.

So what I'm saying here is that we have to look at the specific purpose much more than I think we did in the past. So today's Naval Commander must be the same man of action, must have the same leadership capabilities as the days of old, but he must also have the ability to, for instance, use computers but think faster. Using a computer isn't a simple thing. You've got to be smarter than that dumb machine. And by being smarter I don't mean that you put your finger on the button instead of the computer's. Unless you understand what that computer's telling you, unless you understand how much information you need, and how much will swamp you, you may find that you have no alternative when the computer says, "Push," or "Don't push." You've got to be smart.

And our Naval Leader today must understand something of probabilities and calculations of how much he should use at one Force or another. He must look at the probability of success based on all of these factors that are available to him. We call this "conditional probabilities." It was a conditional probability that you would shoot down the bomber; a conditional probability that you would decoy with electronics; a conditional probability that you would shoot down the missile with a gun or a missile; a conditional probability that the enemy missile would in fact, have a failure and dump itself into the ocean.

Tomorrow's Commander must be sure that he understands what all those probabilities are so that he takes advantage of each one and maximizes his opportunity.

This change in the way we do business has several impacts on the way the Navy is going to shape itself in the years to come. First, we must continue to produce men who are highly capable in technical fields. Beyond that, we must accent the thinking, reasoning, and analytic process in our officer education. And this is why at the Naval War College this year we have instituted an entirely new curriculum; because the officers we are training there are moving well into the top of their career, and out of this group are going to come some of the real leaders of our Navy of the next decade. And we're trying to make them think more, reason more, and instead of being spoonfed with lecturers and classroom activities, they're doing things like--right now they're reading a thousand pages of Military History a week. They're writing an essay, and they're going to Seminar discussions where they hammer out all sides of an issue. And they're working harder than ever before because they must achieve these qualities I have described. I'm a poor one to judge whether we are, in fact, succeeding, but I have one measure that I think is encouraging. The Manager of the Officers' Club at Newport tells me the profits of his bar are down by two-thirds this year.

A last impact on the Navy of this kind of change of doing business is in our recruiting. We simply must get our share of the brighter young people of this country. We're going to

an all-volunteer force. That creates new challenges for us. We need your help. And I know that we can count on it from you, the citizen arm of the Navy. And I think the area where you can help most is in things like your Sea Cadet program. But in doing things like that, and insuring that the youth of this country are raised with an understanding that the military profession is an honorable profession, a patriotic profession, and a necessary one--necessary if we are going to deter conflict and preserve peace. And I am encouraged because I think the very nature of the beast I am describing will help us in our recruiting efforts. In short, today, with this greater intellectual challenge in the Navy added to the traditional appeals of a Navy career, I think it is more enticing than before. There's going to be less marching in step to pre-planned doctrine, more room for initiative and imagination. And I sincerely believe that the young men of our country will perceive that our national security in the years ahead will depend more than ever before on the intellectual fiber of their military leaders. This is not only if we are forced into actual combat, because we all hope that we will be able to avoid that. But if we are not smart enough to stay ahead of the enemy in technology, in tactics, we will not deter him, and we will be forced into situations that are against our national interests.

And therefore, whether we are forced into employing military force again or not, we very likely could be in large part a product of the intellectual capabilities that your Armed Forces possess.

I'm excited about today's Navy. I find it stimulating, challenging, and I see tomorrow's Navy as even more so. With the support of citizens like you I am very confident that we can find within today's youth, the intellectual leadership that will keep your Navy strong and your nation safe.

Thank you so much for letting me be with you today! #

End of Lecture. (by VADM Stansfield Turner, USN)

Turner